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Abstract
This paper presents a model for analyzing the optimal dynamic behavior
of a bank. The model considers the development of the bank's balance
sheet in a situation involving the risk of a nancial crisis which may or
may not materialize, and the timing of which is uncertain. Depending on
the parameter congurations, the crisis may involve defaulting of loans
as well as a reduction in the availability of funding. The model consid-
ers the precautionary measures that the bank takes in preparation for
the potential crisis as well as the bank's reactions to the crisis, in case
it materializes. An optimization model is presented, in which the bank
dynamically adjusts the size and composition of its balance sheet, which
includes cash, loans, deposits and equity. The model is shown to exhibit
behavior that appears to be intuitively logical as e.g. lending is reduced
as a precautionary measure for the anticipated nancial crisis and cash
reserves are increased in order to maintain sucient liquidity. The process
of maturity transformation, being a concept very central to banking, is
also an essential element of the model.
Key words: Banking, nancial crisis, stochastic programming, ALM
E-mail: rasmus.ahvenniemi@helsinki.
1
1 Introduction
One of the most central functions of a bank is that of maturity transformation,
in which the bank transforms liabilities that have short maturities into assets,
the maturities of which are longer. As a result, the turnover rate of the bank's
liabilities is higher than that of its assets, i.e. the bank needs to renew its funding
at a relatively high frequency. From the perspective of a bank, a nancial crisis
may involve on one hand the defaulting of some of its lending and on the other
hand a diculty of obtaining new funding as the market may have concerns
regarding the solvency of the bank and since other nancial institutions may
want to hold on to their liquid assets in such a situation. Both of these issues
reduce the bank's ability to pay back its maturing liabilities during a nancial
crisis. As a result, in order for a bank to remain liquid, i.e. being able to repay
its maturing liabilities, it needs to adjust its balance sheet as a precautionary
measure for the possibility of a nancial crisis. This it needs to do even if it does
not know if and when the anticipated crisis is going to materialize. In addition,
it may need to take actions during the crisis.
This paper presents a model for analyzing the dynamic behavior of a bank
and the development of the bank's balance sheet. The model is applied to
analyzing the bank's actions before and during a nancial crisis in a situation
where it is uncertain when the crisis is going to start and whether it is going
to materialize at all. The model is an optimization model, in which the bank's
funding and lending, as well as their dierent maturities, are modeled explicitly,
thereby exhibiting the process of maturity transformation.
Much of the literature in economics relating to crises in banking considers
bank runs, such as the well-known paper by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and
contagious bank runs, i.e. bank panics, such as the papers e.g. by Allen and
Gale (1998), Bougheas (1999), and Dasgupta (2004). Other models, concerning
nancial crises from the viewpoint of systemic risk and nancial contagion,
include e.g. the simulation-based models by Iori et al. (2006) and, more recently,
by Ladley (2010).
Microeconomic models focusing on the management of a bank's balance
sheet are rare. Some models of this kind may be found within the Industrial
Organization approach to banking (see e.g. Freixas and Rochet (2008)). One
model along these lines which considers the behavior of an individual bank is
presented by Klein (1971). In contrast, in the eld of management science there
is a substantial amount of literature regarding the modeling of individual banks
and their balance sheets. These models are often Asset-Liability Management
(ALM) models based on the methodology of stochastic programming (see. e.g.
Dupacova (1995)). Such models are presented e.g. by Kusy and Ziemba (1986),
Booth et al. (1989), Oguzsoy and Guven (1997), and Mulvey and Shetty (2004).
This paper applies the methodology of stochastic programming, more com-
monly used in the eld of management science, to the eld of economics. The
methodology and the dynamic management of the balance sheet of the modeled
bank dierentiate the model presented here from typical banking models in the
eld of economics. The methodology allows for a detailed analysis of the dynam-
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ics relating to the bank's optimal adjustments of its balance sheet. On the other
hand, compared to existing management science literature involving stochastic
programming ALM models, the main dierence is that instead of presenting
a model for the purpose of nancial planning in a bank, the focus here is on
developing a model for getting general-level, economic insight into the actions
of a bank facing a nancial crisis. Therefore, compared to similar models in the
eld of management science, the amount of parameters is relatively low and the
model structure is relatively simple. The simplied model structure allows for
increased transparency of the functioning of the model and makes it possible
to draw economic conclusions from the outcomes. Another dierence to typical
stochastic programming models is the dierent structure of the scenario tree
applied. In comparison to many stochastic programming models, the scenario
tree structure applied here is very simple, as it involves a very small number of
points where the scenario tree diverges into more than one subsequent scenarios.
This allows for a large number of decision-making periods whereas the number
of alternative economic scenarios is modest. As a result of the larger number of
periods, shorter period lengths may be applied, which in turn allows for more
accurate modeling of decisions relating to lending and funding happening on a
relatively short time-scale.
The purpose of this paper is to present a model for analyzing the dynamic
behavior of a bank, particularly in a situation potentially involving a nancial
crisis, and to conrm that the model behaves logically. The model has potential
for being applied to the analysis of a wider range of crises, scenario structures
and parameter congurations than the ones considered here. The model is
presented in Section 2. The outcomes of the model are analyzed in the case
of nancial crises of three dierent types. First, Section 3.1.1 considers a crisis
involving defaulting loans. Then, Section 3.1.2 considers a liquidity crisis, i.e.
a crisis where the bank has diculties obtaining new funding from the market.
Third, Section 3.1.3 combines these two basic types of crises by considering a
liquidity crisis involving defaulting loans. Finally, Section 3.2 considers the
impact that dierent parameter congurations have on the bank's behavior
before a nancial crisis starts, by varying the values of parameters dening
the type, severity and duration of the crisis.
2 The Model
2.1 Assumptions Regarding the Model Structure
The methodology applied in the model is that of scenario based multistage
stochastic programming with recourse (see. e.g. Dupacova (1995)). The model
is formulated as a linear programming model. The model diers from typical
stochastic programming models in that the total number of scenarios in the sce-
nario tree is very small relative to the number of periods. The planning horizon
considered is divided into a large number of periods in order to allow for a high
resolution in the modeling of the bank's dynamic behavior.
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Figure 1: The scenario tree structure of the model.
Figure 1 presents the scenario tree structure applied in the model. The total
number of periods in the model is 84, and each period represents the time span of
one month. The rst 36 periods, i.e. the initial periods are spent in preparation
for the crisis, and it is assumed, that there is no stochasticity during these. The
next 24 periods, i.e. Periods 37-60, are risky periods, during which the crisis may
or may not start. Once the crisis has started, it is assumed that the bank knows
how it is going to continue in that scenario. The 24 nal periods, i.e. Periods
61-84, constitute a phase during which the crisis will not start anymore, but may
continue, if it has started in one of the last risky periods. These last 24 periods
do not involve stochasticity. The issues involving uncertainty in the model are
thus whether the crisis will materialize at all and at what point in time it will
start. There is a total of 25 scenarios in the model. Scenarios 1-24 represent
the outcomes in which a crisis starts in Periods 37-60, respectively. Scenario 25
represents the outcome where the crisis does not materialize at all. In case that
the crisis materializes, it is assumed to last for 6 consecutive periods. Figure 2
depicts the scenario-period combinations of the model.
The assumptions regarding the scenario tree structure are of course simpli-
cations. In reality, e.g. a bank in a nancial crisis would not know for sure
how the crisis would be going to continue. In the context of analyzing the prob-
lem at hand, such simplications may, however, be considered appropriate, as
the focus is on getting an overview of the precautionary measures taken by a
bank in preparation for an uncertain crisis, and on its reactions to a crisis of a
specied kind. A simple scenario tree structure also improves the transparency
of the model. Many of the simplifying assumptions of the model, such as those
relating to the scenario tree structure, could be relaxed in future extensions of
the model.
The asset side of the bank's balance sheet is assumed to consist of liquid
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Figure 2: The scenarios and periods in the model. There are 84 time periods
and 25 scenarios. The boxes painted in black represent those scenario-period
combinations where there is a nancial crisis going on. The nancial crisis lasts
for 6 consecutive periods. Scenario 25 represents the case that the nancial
crisis does not materialize at all.
Table 1: The initial balance sheet of the bank.
Cash 0 Deposits 90
Loans 100 Equity 10
assets represented by Cash, and non-liquid assets represented by Loans. The
liability side is assumed to consists of Deposits, which are assumed to include,
in addition to actual deposits, also a number of other forms of funding, such
as borrowing from other nancial institutions. In addition, the balance sheet
contains Equity. While being a simplication, the balance sheet applied in the
model is sucient for capturing some of the most relevant aspects of the func-
tioning of a bank, and for analyzing some of the most relevant decisions of the
bank. These decisions include the allocation of the bank's funds between liquid
assets (Cash) and less liquid assets (Loans), as well as the amount of funding
(Deposits) which is used to adjust the size of the bank's balance sheet. The
maturities of the bank's Loans are longer than those of its Deposits, exhibiting
the bank's function of maturity transformation, which is a central element of
the model. The amounts of each balance sheet item in the initial balance sheet
are presented in Table 1.
2.2 The Equations
Tables 2 and 3 list the parameters and variables of the model, respectively.
The indices i 2 1:::I and j 2 1:::J refer to the scenarios and periods of the
model, respectively. The values of parameters di;jL and m
i;j
D dene the economic
environment at a given point in time in a given scenario by determining the
amounts of defaulting loans and the availability of new funding. During a crisis
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Table 2: The parameters of the model. The values of parameters di;jL and m
i;j
D
presented in the table represent a situation, where there is no nancial crisis
going on, and they will obtain dierent values during nancial crises.
Parameter Value Denition
I 25 Number of scenarios
J 84 Number of periods
J1 36 Number of initial periods
Ci;0 0 Initial amount of Cash
Li;0 100 Initial amount of Loans
Di;0 90 Initial amount of Deposits
Ei;0 10 Initial amount of Equity
rL 0.003274 Interest on lending per period (4 % per year)
rD 0.001652 Interest on deposits per period (2 % per year)
L 24 Maturity of loans (periods)
D 12 Maturity of deposits (periods)
di;jL 0 Fraction of maturing loans defaulting
mi;jD 0.5 Maximum amount of new deposits as a fraction of equity
P 1:::P 24 0:5=24 Probabilities of the scenarios involving a nancial crisis
P 25 0.5 Probability of the scenario involving no nancial crisis
Table 3: The variables of the model.
Variable Denition
Ci;j Cash
Li;j Loans
Di;j Deposits
Ei;j Equity
i;jL New Loans
i;jD New Deposits
M i;jL Loans maturing
M i;jD Deposits maturing
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involving defaulting loans, the parameter di;jL obtains positive values. This case
is considered in Section 3.1.1. Similarly, during a liquidity crisis, the parameter
mi;jD obtains values that are small or zero. This case is considered in Section
3.1.2. Both of these aspects are present in the case of a liquidity crisis involving
defaulting loans, which is considered in Section 3.1.3.
The bank is assumed to maximize its expected nal-period utility. The
bank's utility is assumed to equal its scenario-specic amount of Equity and thus
the bank is assumed to be risk-neutral. Therefore, the corresponding objective
function, presented in Equation 1 is dened as the expected amount of Equity
in the nal period.
Equations 2 and 3 dene how the amounts of Loans and Deposits develop.
They are decreased by the amounts maturing and increased by the amounts of
new Loans or new Deposits. Equation 4 denes the amount of Equity based on
Equity in the previous period and the prots obtained in the current period.
Prots depend on the interest income on Loans, the interest costs of holding
Deposits and the losses from defaulting loans.
Equation 5 ensures that the balance sheet identity holds, i.e. that assets
and their funding are equal. The balance sheet identity makes it unnecessary
to dene a separate equation for the amount of Cash in the balance sheet, since
it is implied by the amounts of Loans, Deposits and Equity.
It is assumed that the principals relating to Loans and Deposits are paid
back at maturity. The maturities of Loans and Deposits are assumed to dier
from each other, which reects the bank's function of maturity transformation.
It is assumed that the Loans initially in the balance sheet are composed of equal
amounts of securities of each maturity, thus determining the amounts maturing
in Periods j 2 1:::L. Similarly, the amounts of Deposits maturing in Periods
j 2 1:::D are determined by the Deposits initially in the balance sheet. These
assumptions are reected by Equations 6 and 8.
Equations 7 and 9 determine the amounts of Loans and Deposits maturing in
periods in which all the securities held initially have already matured. Therefore,
in these periods, the amounts of Loans and Deposits maturing are determined
by the amounts of new Loans and new Deposits L and D periods earlier,
respectively.
The bank's ability to obtain new funding in the form of Deposits is dened
by Equation 10. It is assumed that Deposits are available in a linear relation
to the amount of equity that the bank has at any time. On one hand, this
assumption represents, as a proxy of the size of the bank, its ability to attract
depositors, and on the other hand it represents, in the form of a measure of
solvency, its ability to obtain funding from other nancial institutions.
In addition to these constraints, there are nonanticipativity constraints (see
e.g. Birge (1995) or Dupacova (1995)), which dene the structure of the scenario
tree, while at the same time dening the information that the decision-maker has
in dierent scenarios at dierent points in time. These constraints are dened for
all decision variables in the model. The nonanticipativity constraints dening
the scenario tree structure shown in Figure 1 are dened by Equation 11 where
Xi;j is a vector containing the values of all the decision variables in Scenario i at
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time j. The nonanticipativity constraints state that before the crisis begins, it is
impossible to distinguish a given scenario from the scenario where the nancial
crisis does not materialize at all. This also implies that scenarios, in which the
crisis has not yet begun in a given period, cannot be distinguished from each
other. It should be noted that before the crisis starts in a given scenario, also the
parameters dening the economic environment are equal to those in the scenario
where the crisis does not materialize at all. The nonanticipativity constraints
are consistent with Figure 2, which shows the combinations of scenarios and
periods where there is a nancial crisis going on.
The objective function:
Max
IX
i=1
P iEi;J (1)
The constraints dening the positions:
Li;j = Li;j 1  M i;jL +i;jL 8i 2 1:::I; j 2 1:::J (2)
Di;j = Di;j 1  M i;jD +i;jD 8i 2 1:::I; j 2 1:::J (3)
Ei;j = Ei;j 1 + rLLi;j 1   rDDi;j 1   di;jL M i;jL 8i 2 1:::I; j 2 1:::J (4)
The constraints dening the balance sheet identity:
Ci;j + Li;j = Di;j + Ei;j 8i 2 1:::I; j 2 1:::J (5)
The constraints dening the amounts of maturing Loans and De-
posits:
M i;jL = L
i;0=L 8i 2 1:::I; j 2 1:::L (6)
M i;jL = 
i;j L
L 8i 2 1:::I; j 2 (L + 1):::J (7)
M i;jD = D
i;0=D 8i 2 1:::I; j 2 1:::D (8)
M i;jD = 
i;j D
D 8i 2 1:::I; j 2 (D + 1):::J (9)
The constraints dening the maximum amount of new Deposits:
i;jD  mi;jD Ei;j 8i 2 1:::I; j 2 1:::J (10)
8
The nonanticipativity constraints:
Xi;j = XI;j 8i 2 1:::I   1; j 2 1:::J1 + i  1 (11)
3 Results
3.1 Dynamic Behavior of the Bank
3.1.1 Case: Defaulting Loans
The rst type of nancial crisis considered is one during which some of the
bank's loans default at maturity, whereas it is assumed that there is no liquidity
crisis going on, i.e. the bank's ability to obtain new funding is not reduced. It
is assumed that during the crisis, 25% of the loans maturing in each period
default, i.e. di;jL = 0:25, while the other values of the parameters presented in
Table 2 remain unchanged.
Figure 3(a) depicts how the amounts of each balance sheet item develop over
the planning horizon in case of the middle scenario, i.e. Scenario 12, in which
the nancial crisis starts in Period 48. Figure 3(b), on the other hand depicts
the developments in the case that the nancial crisis does not materialize at
all. It can be seen, that the two scenarios are identical before Period 48, i.e.
before the crisis starts. Figures 4(a) and 4(b) depict how Cash and Loans,
respectively, develop over the planning horizon in all the 25 scenarios of the
model. The corresponding developments of Deposits and Equity are depicted
in Figures 5(a) and 5(b), respectively.
The bank starts to accumulate Cash before the crisis begins, while at the
same time lending less. By doing so, it avoids losses from Loans that would be
maturing and defaulting during the crisis. A few periods into the risky phase,
if the crisis has not started yet, the bank transfers the Cash, that it has been
accumulating, back into Loans, since the Loans, having long maturities, will be
maturing only when the potential crisis is already over. When the crisis starts,
the bank's lending is reduced, since the losses it takes from defaulting Loans
reduce its Equity and thus reduce its ability to obtain new funding.
3.1.2 Case: Liquidity Crisis
The second kind of crisis considered is a liquidity crisis, in which the bank's
ability to obtain funding (Deposits) is drastically reduced, whereas the crisis
considered here does not involve defaulting Loans. It is assumed that during
the crisis mi;jD = 0:1, while the other values of the parameters presented in Table
2 remain unchanged.
Figures 3(c) and 3(d) depict the development of the bank's balance sheet in
the middle scenario and in the scenario in which the nancial crisis does not
materialize at all. Figures 4(c) and 4(d) depict how Cash and Loans, respec-
tively, develop over the planning horizon in all the 25 scenarios of the model.
The corresponding developments of Deposits and Equity are depicted in Figures
5(c) and 5(d), respectively.
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The bank starts to accumulate Cash instead of Loans before the crisis. It
needs the extra Cash in order to be able to repay the Deposits that mature
during the crisis, since Loans, having longer maturities than Deposits, mature
too slowly in order to provide a sucient inow of cash while the lack of liquidity
reduces its ability to obtain new funding for repaying its maturing Deposits.
This way, the bank can remain suciently prepared for the potential liquidity
crisis. During the liquidity crisis, the bank's lending is reduced even further as
new funding is scarcely available.
3.1.3 Case: Liquidity Crisis with Defaulting Loans
The third kind of crisis considered is a combination of the two types of crises
considered above, i.e. a combination of a liquidity crisis and a crisis involving
defaulting loans. It is thus assumed, that during the crisis, 25% of the loans
maturing default while at the same time the bank's ability to obtain new funding
is reduced. Thus, di;jL = 0:25 and m
i;j
D = 0:1 during the crisis.
Figures 3(e) and 3(f) depict the development of the bank's balance sheet in
the middle scenario and in the scenario in which the nancial crisis does not
materialize at all. Figures 4(e) and 4(f) depict how Cash and Loans, respectively,
develop over the planning horizon in all the 25 scenarios of the model. The
corresponding developments of Deposits and Equity are depicted in Figures
5(e) and 5(f), respectively.
The bank starts to reduce the size of its balance sheet before the crisis
begins. The defaulting of Loans together with the bank's diculty of obtaining
new Deposits for repaying maturing older Deposits during the crisis, force the
bank either to hold less Deposits, or to hold Cash reserves in order to avoid
defaulting. As there is an implicit cost on holding Cash reserves (i.e. the cost of
interest on Deposits) and the attractiveness of lending is reduced by the risk of
defaults, the bank chooses to hold less Deposits while at the same time lending
less. When the crisis starts, the bank's lending is further reduced as it becomes
dicult to obtain new funding.
A few periods into the risky phase, if the crisis has not started yet, the bank
starts to increase its lending again, since after a certain point, new Loans will be
maturing only when the potential crisis is already over. This requires additional
funding in the form of Deposits. Part of the new funding is held in the form
of Cash, in order for the bank to be able to survive without defaulting in the
event that the crisis would still materialize.
3.2 Varying the Parameters Dening the Crisis
The bank's behavior before and during the nancial crisis is aected by the
type of crisis considered. In this section, the values of the parameters dening
the type, severity and duration of the anticipated crisis are varied, and the
implications on the bank's dynamic behavior are considered.
The surface plots in Figure 6 depict the development of the amount of Loans
in the bank's balance sheet in the scenario where the crisis does not materialize
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at all. The development is depicted at dierent values of the parameters deter-
mining the type, severity and duration of the crisis. While these plots consider
only the case where no crisis materializes, they nonetheless provide insight into
how the bank prepares for the potential crisis at dierent parameter values.
Based on Figure 6, it can be concluded that crises involving more defaults,
or more signicant reductions in the availability of funding, induce the bank to
lend less, as a precautionary measure. However, such precautionary measures
appear to be taken only if the potential crisis is expected to be severe enough.
If the duration of the anticipated crisis is longer, more drastic precautionary
measures appear to be taken.
4 Conclusions
This paper presents a model, the purpose of which is to analyze the optimal
dynamic behavior of a bank in an environment that involves stochastic elements.
The model sheds light on how a bank engaging in maturity transformation
adjusts its balance sheet before and during a nancial crisis. The scenario tree
structure, as well as a number of parameters that are specied for each scenario
and period, dene the uncertainties involved. In this paper, there is assumed
to be uncertainty as to when the crisis is going to start and also whether it
is going to materialize at all. While the sources of uncertainty considered are
relatively simple, the model could also be applied to more complex scenario tree
structures.
Simplications had to be made in order to maintain sucient transparency
of the model and to be able to draw conclusions regarding the impacts of dif-
ferent parameters. Despite the simplications, the model includes features that
are very central to the banking rm. These features include e.g. maturity
transformation, the adjustment of the size of the bank's balance sheet, and the
adjustment of the share of liquid assets in the balance sheet.
The outcomes of the model show that the bank takes actions in order to
prepare for the anticipated nancial crisis even though it is uncertain whether
the crisis is going to materialize. These actions illustrate the bank's optimal
dynamic behavior subject to a number of constraints, that e.g. force the bank
to keep its balance sheet in such a condition that it will not default on its
Deposits. The anlysis considers nancial crises that involve defaulting loans,
reduced availability of funding (i.e. a liquidity crisis), and combinations of
these two basic types of crises.
Observations that can be made based on the outcomes of the model include
e.g. the bank's tendency to reduce its lending in preparation for an anticipated
nancial crisis as well as its tendency to accumulate cash reserves in order to
maintain sucient liquidity. The fact that the bank holds cash reserves even
though they provide zero returns contradicts the assumption sometimes made
in the theory of banking that banks would only hold the minimum amouont
of cash required by regulations (Freixas and Rochet, 2008, p. 71). Running
the model at dierent parameter congurations also indicates that the more
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severe the anticipated crisis and the longer its duration, the more drastic are
the precautionary measures taken in preparation for the crisis.
The actions taken by the bank in some of the outcomes of the model may
seem unrealistically radical e.g. involving signicant changes in the composition
and size of the balance sheet. In reality, a bank's actions may be constrained
e.g. by market illiquidity, transaction costs, policies, regulations etc. However,
constraining the model as little as possible gives good insight into the incentives
of a banking rm in the economic situations considered. On a general level, the
phenomena observed by using a model such as the one considered here are likely
to appear also in more constrained and realistic environments. Despite being
perhaps somewhat radical, the bank's actions in the outcomes of the model
appear to be logical and they are in line with what one might intuitively expect
to observe. The model is suciently detailed in order to be able to capture
relevant dynamics of a bank facing a nancial crisis. The bank also appears
to react logically to dierent values of the parameters determining the type,
severity, and duration of the crisis.
The model presented here could be used to analyze the dynamic behavior and
incentives of a generic bank in dierent kinds of dynamic economic and nancial
environments involving stochastic elements. Whereas the main purpose of this
paper is to present the model and verify that it behaves logically, further research
could be carried out in more realistic settings, using the same model or a model
closely resembling the one presented here. This could involve redening the
scenario tree structure and using dierent values for the parameters dening
the economic environment in the scenarios and periods of the model.
In the model presented here, the future is completely known to the bank at
the moment when the nancial crisis starts. A more realistic assumption would
be that both the length of the crisis and the development of its severity would
be unknown to the bank in advance. One approach to modeling macroeconomic
developments could be to construct a Markov chain for representing the transi-
tions from one state of the economy to another. These states could dier from
each other at least for the part of the values of the parameters dening the per-
centage of loans defaulting and the availability of new funding. Also the interest
rate parameters could be made dependent on the economic environment. Incor-
porating a stochastic process of this kind into the scenario tree would require
a far larger number of scenarios. This might turn out to be computationally
challenging and the lesser transparency of the outcomes would make it harder to
interpret the results. It would however constitute a more realistic way of mod-
eling the information that the bank has at a given moment. The development
of a nancial crisis could then also be more realistically specied.
One possible modication to the equations dening the optimization model
would be to allow the bank to default on its own Deposits, while such defaults
perhaps could be assumed to have negative impacts on the bank's utility. A
benet of this relaxation would be that the optimization model would then not
turn out to be infeasible, i.e. to have no solutions satisfying all constraints,
in situations where no precautionary measures could have saved the bank from
defaulting. This modication would increase the exibility of using the model,
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as it would allow a larger range of potential future economic developments to
be considered, including crises of extreme severity. In addition, this would
increase the realism of the model, as defaults do happen in the real world, and
also since it is unlikely that banks have the ability or the incentives to take
sucient precautions against every scenario, some of which may have very low
probabilities.
Furthermore, the analysis could be extended from the context of a single
bank to that of an interbank market. One could for example assume that some
fraction of the Loans in the balance sheet would represent lending to other banks
or, alternatively, one could model interbank lending as a separate balance sheet
item. In any case, the willingness of a bank to lend to other banks could partly
determine the availability of funding to the other banks. Thus, the model could
be extended to include the analysis of systemic risks relating to the banking
sector.
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(e) Liquidity crisis with defaulting Loans:
Middle scenario
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Figure 3: Development of the balance sheet in the three types of crises con-
sidered. Panels (a), (c), and (e) depict the middle scenario (Scenario 12), where
the crisis begins in the middle of the risky phase (in Period 48). Panels (b), (d),
and (f) depict the scenario where the crisis does not materialize at all (Scenario
25).
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Figure 4: Development of the amounts of Cash and Loans in the three types
of crises considered.
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Figure 5: Development of the amounts of Deposits and Equity in the three
types of crises considered.
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(a) Amount of defaults varied.
Duration of crisis: 6 periods.
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(b) Availability of funding varied.
Duration of crisis: 6 periods.
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(c) Amount of defaults varied.
Duration of crisis: 12 periods.
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(d) Availability of funding varied.
Duration of crisis: 12 periods.
Figure 6: Development of Loans in the scenario where the crisis does not
materialize, considered at dierent values of the parameters determining the
type, severity and duration of the crisis.
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